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Chapter 5
Equilibrium Play and Best
Response in Sequential Constant
Sum Games
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we identiﬁed a class of non-trivial games for which Nash
Equilibrium predictions work much better than in similar previous research.1 This
occurred even if the games were played in the laboratory for the ﬁrst time by non-
Economics trained subjects with no feedback. These games were two-player 3x3 con-
stant sum normal form games with unique equilibria in pure strategies and with diﬀer-
ent number of rounds of iterated deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies necessary to
reach the Nash equilibrium. We here study how well the subgame perfect equilibrium
prediction works in sequential games which share the same payoﬀ matrix as the nor-
mal form games of the previous chapter and that were played again by Non-Economics
trained subjects for the ﬁrst time without previous experience in the laboratory. We
check if the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction works as well for these games as
the Nash equilibrium prediction did in the simultaneous move games of the previous
chapter.
There are several reasons why this question is interesting. Notice that in constant
sum games the Nash equilibrium outcome of the normal form games and the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential games coincide. This is because, thinking
in terms of backwards induction for a game with two players, when the last mover in
1See, for example, McCabe et al. (1994), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994)), Stahl and Wilson (1995),
Broseta et al. (2001), Brown and Rosenthal (1990), Rapapport and Boebel (1992) and Mookherjee
and Sopher (1997)).
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sequential games optimally chooses the action that maximizes his payoﬀs given the
options left available, he minimizes the payoﬀso ft h eﬁrst mover and thus, a ﬁrst
mover optimally chooses the strategy that maximizes the minimum of his possible
payoﬀs. This Maximin (or Minimax) strategy follows exactly the same logic as the
Nash equilibrium strategy in normal form constant sum games. However, even if the
theoretical outcome may coincide between the simultaneous and the sequential move
games it is possible that when laboratory subjects actually play the sequential games
the outcomes may diﬀer.
A possible reason for diﬀerences in the outcomes of simultaneous and sequential
games with the same payoﬀ matrix may be that subjects may put greater weight
on other regarding preferences in sequential games. This would seem particularly
true for models of other regarding preferences that incorporate intentionality, as the
sequentiality of the games makes clear that a second player’s decision is contingent on
the ﬁrst player’s choice and therefore, the way a second mover interprets the intentions
of the strategy chosen by a ﬁrst mover can clearly inﬂuence the outcome of the play.
Anticipating this, a ﬁrst mover may carefully select his own strategy in order to make,
for example, the second mover interpret his intentions in a way that may induce him
to reward supposedly kind behaviour by the ﬁrst mover.
On the other hand, as we argued in the previous chapter, in constant sum games
behaviour should not be aﬀected by other regarding preferences that do not include
concerns for intentionality, i.e., distributional preferences. The theoretical argument
is that distributional preferences should not aﬀect choices as long as subjects care
more for their own payoﬀs than for those of other subjects.2 This is because subjects
who care about opponents’ payoﬀs would have to give up the same units of payoﬀs
that would go to their opponent in order to increase their opponents’ payoﬀs. We
showed previously that this theoretical argument, although compatible with other
possible explanations, is not proven wrong by laboratory play in simultaneous constant
form games. However, if we want to be more general and study for which types of
games theory predictions are not aﬀected by other regarding preferences, both with
and without intentions, we precisely need to study games in which we suspect that
intentions may play a role, and that is why we choose sequential constant sum games.
T h e r ei sa tl e a s to n et y p eo fc o n s t a n ts u mg a m e si nw h i c ht h e r ei se v i d e n c et h a t
other regarding preferences may aﬀect laboratory play: dictator games.3 In them, a
single subject has to allocate a ﬁxed amount between him and another subject, with
no strategic decision being taken by the receiver. When dictator games have been
played in the laboratory strictly controlling for anonymity (both between subjects and
2Camerer et al. (1998) discuss this argument.
3See Hoﬀman, McCabe and Smith (1999) and Roth (1995).5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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with respect to the experimenter) there is a signiﬁcant proportion of subjects who
do not concord with the equilibrium prediction and allocate the minimum possible
amount to the other player.4 In our experiment, the situation faced by second movers
is similar to the allocators’ situation in dictator games. In fact, we could deﬁne second
movers’ strategic situation as “mini-dictator” games, since second movers do not have
a continuous choice but they can only choose between three actions. There is a diﬀer-
ence however between mini-dictator games and our games: when second movers in our
games have to choose their action, they are limited by the action taken by ﬁrst movers
and therefore, intentionality and willingness to reward kind behaviour may aﬀect their
choices. In dictator games, there is no possible response to the allocator’s strategy
and thus, non equilibrium outcomes may be explained by distributional preferences by
themselves, with no need of reciprocal or intentionally driven other regarding prefer-
ences. We are aware of two experiments with sequential constant sum games in which
two players make decisions. In Falk and Kosfeld (2005) second movers decide an allo-
cation of a constant quantity between then and a ﬁrst mover, after observing whether
the ﬁrst mover decides to restrict or not the interval in which the second mover can
decide. Thus, second movers face a dictator game situation once ﬁrst movers have
restricted them or not. They observe that when ﬁrst movers restrict second movers,
they allocate less to ﬁrst movers. Thus, although the subgame perfect equilibrium
prediction is not fulﬁlled, the “intentions”5 signalled by whether ﬁrst movers restrict
or not makes a diﬀerence on second movers. Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey (1996) carried
out sequential constant sum centipede games in which, at the ﬁrst round, payoﬀsa r e
divided evenly and, as the players pass, the division gets more and more lopsided.
T h e yo b s e r v et h a tt h es u b g a m ep e r f e c tequilibrium prediction in which the ﬁrst mover
takes in the ﬁrst round works much better than in centipede games which are not
constant sum. Therefore, we expect our results to be driven by the fact that games
are constant sum and that both players can make decisions and thus, they may be
signalling their intentions.
In terms of both subjects having an option to decide strategically, our games also
resemble ultimatum games, in which also non subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
are frequently observed (Güth et al. (1982)). A key diﬀerence with our games is that
in ultimatum games, the second mover has the clear option to punish the ﬁrst mover
by rejecting his allocation and leaving both players with no payoﬀs. In ultimatum
games, such a threat would not be credible if second movers are only concerned for
own payoﬀ maximization, but it has been observed that not only a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of second movers exercise such threat, but that this threat is credible to ﬁrst
4See Bolton and Zwick (1995) and Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998).
5Referred as “trust” by the authors.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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movers and they rarely allocate the minimum possible amount to second movers. The
most frequent explanation for such behavior is that subjects have other regarding pref-
erences that include intentionality. Ultimatum games are not constant sum because
of the possibility of rejecting oﬀers and leaving both players with no payoﬀs. In the
games studied in this chapter, this possibility does not exist and in fact, the maximum
“punishment” a second mover can inﬂict on a ﬁrst mover is by choosing his own payoﬀ
maximizing strategy. However, although in constant sum games there is no possibility
of punishment, second movers’ intentionality driven other regarding preferences could
manifest themselves in second movers rewarding kind behaviour by ﬁrst movers and
thus, giving up some units of payoﬀsi nf a v o u ro fﬁrst movers who have taken and
action interpreted as kind by second movers. Notice that other explanations for sec-
ond movers non payoﬀ maximizing behaviour are possible and we try to discriminate
between them using both the data and the results of an informal questionnaire.
There is a clear way in which subjects’ choices in our games could show that
subjects have other regarding preferences. As in the previous chapter, we designed a
treatment in which one of the outcomes in all the games would be that payoﬀsw e r e
exactly equally split. In such treatment, ﬁrst movers choosing strategies that may
lead to the equal split outcome could be signalling to second movers their intention to
split the payoﬀs evenly. Therefore, second movers who also choose to equally split the
payoﬀs may be responding reciprocally to ﬁrst movers’ strategy. We compare whether
the feasibility of exactly equally splitting the payoﬀsi n ﬂuenced subjects behaviour,
by comparing choices in treatments that included the feasibility of equal splits in
all ten games with choices in treatments in which such equal split was replaced by
a less equal outcome, without aﬀecting the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction.
Although the feasibility of exactly equal splits have been shown to have an important
eﬀect in ultimatum games (Güth, Huck and Müller, (2001)), we ﬁnd no such eﬀects in
our games.
The chapter studies how close subjects behaviour was to the subgame perfect
equilibrium prediction and enquires whether subjects were able to reason in game
theoretic arguments. It also includes a comparison of the results in this chapter with
the previous chapter. We observe that the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in
sequential constant sum games works even better than the Nash equilibrium prediction
in simultaneous constant sum games. This result indicates that even if the strategy
space is more complex in sequential games, ﬁrst movers seem better able to backward
induct in our sequential games than to calculate Nash equilibria in the simultaneous
ones. Additionally, second movers seem to be good at best responding once they
observe ﬁrst movers’ choices.
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experimental design and procedures. Section 5.3 contains the results and the main
descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 comments on the answers given by subjects on a vol-
untary questionnaire. Section 5.5 concludes. The Appendices contain the instructions
and we also show the games.
5.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
5.2.1 Experimental Design
Subjects were presented with a series of ten 3x3 constant sum games with unique
subgame perfect equilibria. The games had the same payoﬀ matrix as the games
in the previous chapter,6 but the games were now played sequentially. First movers
chose, for each of the ten games, one of three actions (labelled “UP”, “MIDDLE” and
“DOWN”). Then, second movers observed ﬁrst movers’ choice and picked one of their
three actions available (labelled “LEFT”, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT”).
We constructed a 2x2 design according to two criteria. The ﬁrst criterion was
whether ﬁrst movers’ payoﬀs corresponded to the payoﬀs assigned to Column or to
Row subjects in the previous experiment. By having a treatment in which ﬁrst movers’
payoﬀs corresponded to column subjects, but also another where ﬁrst movers’ payoﬀs
corresponded to Row subjects, we can compare our results with the previous experi-
ment with simultaneous play no matter the sequence of actions in this new experiment.
The second criterion, as in the previous experiment, was whether an equal split of
payoﬀs was feasible in each of the games. As the games were constant sum, there was
always the same amount of payoﬀs (£12) to be distributed among the two players. In
the “Fair” treatments (F) an equal split of payoﬀs was feasible in one of the terminal
nodes of each of the games subjects played. Payoﬀs were designed such that both
subjects would get £6 if they both took the action leading to this node being reached.
In the “Unfair” treatments (U), the payoﬀs in this terminal node were substituted
by a more unequal split, such that one subject would get a payoﬀ of £7 and the
other a payoﬀ of £5. For example, in Game 4R below, payoﬀsw h e nﬁrst movers
chose MIDDLE (M) and second movers chose LEFT (L) were £6 for both subjects
i nt h eF a i rt r e a t m e n t s ,w h i l et h e yw e r e£ 5f o rﬁrst movers and £7 for second movers
in the Unfair treatments. The location of this node and the changes in payoﬀsf r o m
the Fair to the Unfair treatments were designed such that in some games it was the
ﬁrst mover who got a better than equal split payoﬀ in the Unfair treatments while
in other games it was the second mover and such that subjects would get a higher
payoﬀ in this terminal node in some games (lower in other games) than when their
6The games can be found in Appendix B.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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actions lead to the subgame perfect equilibrium, referred to simply as “Equilibrium”
from here onwards. Notice that the terminal node in which the equal split was feasible
never coincided with the terminal node that would have been chosen as a result of
both subjects playing according to the subgame perfect equilibrium. Comparing the













































LL L CC C RR R







































































































LL L CC C RR R
Game 4R (Unfair) Game 4R (Fair)
5.2.2 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was carried out with pen and paper in the ELSE laboratory in Decem-
ber 2004. Subjects were recruited by e-mail using the ELSE database, which consists
of UCL undergraduate and graduate students. As we are interested in behaviour
without previous experience by non-Economics trained subjects, we made sure all our
subjects had not participated in previous game experiments and had not taken courses
in Economics or Game Theory.
Our experiment consisted of four sessions with twenty subjects per session. In each
session, ten of the subjects were randomly assigned ﬁrst mover roles in all ten games,
while the other ten subjects were assigned second mover roles. Neutral language was
used by calling subjects “You” and their opponents “Participants in the other group”.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned seats and were asked to read some
preliminary instructions, which described a strategic decision situation and a 3x3 pay-
oﬀ matrix associated with it.7 Therefore, although the games were played sequentially,
the games were presented in similar tables as the ones in the previous experiment.8
7The strategic situations were called “Tables” in the instructions.
8See Appendix B for the actual presentation of the games.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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This allow us to compare our results without recurring to “Presentation eﬀects” expla-
nations.9 Then subjects were required to pass an Understanding Test where they had
to demonstrate that they knew how to map players’ actions in a game to outcomes,
and outcomes to players’ payoﬀs. Subjects were told that those who failed the test
would act as “assistants” in the experiment. However, no subject failed the test in any
treatment and so the over-recruited subjects were asked to assist the experimenter.10
Then, ﬁrst movers chose their action in all ten games. After that, answer sheets
were collected, reorganized and handed to second movers who could observe, for each
game, the action taken by the ﬁrst mover with whom they were matched in that game.
Finally, second movers chose their actions in all ten games. All games were played with
no feedback and the order in which each subject played the 10 games was randomized.
For each game subjects played, they were randomly and anonymously paired with
ad i ﬀerent participant from the other group. Subjects never learned who their matched
participant in each game was.
Subjects were paid as follows. At the end of each session, a number from 1 to 10
was selected from a bingo urn. This number indicated for which of the 10 games all
subjects would be paid.11 Subjects were paid exactly the amount of pounds indicated
in the lower left corner of the cell chosen as a result of their action and the action
chosen by their matched participant in the particular game selected with the bingo
urn.
Subjects were paid the sum of a £5 ﬁxed fee, plus their earnings in the game
selected. Average payments were £11 (around $17 at the time).12 Each session lasted
one hour and each subject was allocated twenty minutes to choose their action.
5.2.3 The Games
In all ten games, two subjects had to choose sequentially among three actions. First
movers chose, for each of the ten games, one of three actions (labelled “UP”, “MID-
DLE” and “DOWN” ). Then, second movers observed ﬁrst movers’ choice and chose
one of their three actions (labelled “LEFT”, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT”). Payoﬀsw e r e
represented by the same matrix as for the games in the previous chapter. Notice that
9Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson (1994), argue for same games played simultaneously or sequentially
that what matters for diﬀerences in behaviour is not the actual presentation of the game but whether
the instructions are explained in simultaneous or sequential form. Here, our games are diﬀerent, but
still we presented payoﬀs similarly.
10All subjects were informed of this.
11We paid subjects for one random game instead of for an aggregated measure of their answers in
all 10 games to be able to maintain a one to one relationship between outcomes and payoﬀs.
12A British pound corresponded to 1.85 American dollars at the time of the experiment. Our design
a l l o w e du st op r o v i d er e a s o n a b l yh i g hi n c e n t i v e sw h i l ek e e p i n go n eo rt w od i g i tn u m b e r st or e p r e s e n t
payoﬀs and avoiding conversion rates from experimental currency to monetary currency.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for these games is the same as the Nash
equilibrium outcome for the simultaneous games of the previous chapter.
We chose one-digit numbers to represent payoﬀs.13 The sum of Row and Column
players’ payments in all cells of all games was 12.14 The ten games were designed such
that the equilibrium did not correspond to the same combination of actions by two
players in more than two games.
5.3 Experimental Results
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 below presents the main descriptive statistics for each game when grouping
all treatments and subject roles. We report, for each of the ten games, the percentage
of times the combination of ﬁrst movers’ and second movers’ choices reached an Equi-
librium outcome, as well as the percentage of ﬁrst movers’ actions taken according to
Equilibrium and the percentage of second movers’ actions that were best responses to
their matched ﬁrst mover’s choice. Results are clear. On average, 91.5% of times, the
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium was reached. First movers played Equilibrium 93.5% of
the times, and second movers best responded to their matched ﬁrst mover’s choice in
94% of the times. Percentages were high and similar across all games.
94 93.5 91.5 Average
97.5 97.5 95 NC
92.5 92.5 90 NR
95 92.5 92.5 4C
92.5 92.5 92.5 4R
92.5 90 90 3C
92.5 95 90 3R
100 97.5 97.5 2C
87.5 92.5 85 2R
92.5 92.5 92.5 1C
97.5 92.5 90 1R
2nd Mover 
Best Responses





94 93.5 91.5 Average
97.5 97.5 95 NC
92.5 92.5 90 NR
95 92.5 92.5 4C
92.5 92.5 92.5 4R
92.5 90 90 3C
92.5 95 90 3R
100 97.5 97.5 2C
87.5 92.5 85 2R
92.5 92.5 92.5 1C
97.5 92.5 90 1R
2nd Mover 
Best Responses





Table 1: Descriptive statistics (percentages).
In the following sections we study these results with further detail.
13We did so because if subjects really chose their actions as a best response to their beliefs, cal-
culating such best response in terms of expected payoﬀsm a yh a v eb e e nm o r ed i ﬃcult if numbers
representing payoﬀs were large, and we did not want to discourage such type of behaviour.
14N u m b e r s1 0a n d1 1w e r eu s e di naf e wg a m e st om a k ei tp o s s i b l et od i s c r i m i n a t em o d e l so f
behavior. Number 0 was not used to avoid behavior being possibly caused by aversion to getting no
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5.3.2 Treatment Eﬀects: Feasibility of Equal Splits
One of the main questions that motivated this follow-up experiment is whether in-
tentionally driven other regarding preferences aﬀected subjects’ choices in sequential
constant sum games, both when subjects played as ﬁrst movers and when they played
as second movers. As commented in the introduction to this chapter, our games are
similar to ultimatum games, where the feasibility of equal splits has proved to aﬀect
how subjects play games (Güth et al. (2001)). In our games however, second movers
do not have the option to reject proposals and thus leave both agents with no pay-
oﬀs, but they have to choose between three possible allocations of payoﬀs between
both subjects, all adding up to the same amount. In those circumstances, a choice
of strategy leading to an equal split of payoﬀs may be an indication of concerns for
the other subject’s payoﬀs. For example, when second movers observe ﬁrst movers’
choices, they may want to reward an action taken by a ﬁrst mover leading to an equal
split with an action that gives both agents the same payoﬀ,e v e ni ft h i si sn o to p t i m a l
for payoﬀ maximizing second movers. At the same time, ﬁrst movers may anticipate
this and choose actions leading to equal splits in the ﬁrst place. If we observed this
type of behaviour when equal splits are feasible but not when it is not, it would be
an indication that subjects may have some concern for being “fair” or for how fair
other subjects interpret that their own choices are. We thus study if the feasibility of
equal splits aﬀected how subjects played the games by comparing choices by ﬁrst and
second movers between treatments in which it was feasible to splits payoﬀse q u a l l y
and treatments in which it was not.
Following the same procedures as in the previous experiment, we ﬁrst use Fisher’s
Exact Probability Test (FEPT) for count data.15 This test allows us to check if
diﬀerences in observed proportions of actions chosen between a game containing equal
splits (“Fair” treatment) and a game where equal splits are not feasible (“Unfair”
treatment) might be expected by chance. The null hypothesis (two-tailed) is that
there is no diﬀerence in the probability of playing each strategy generating the observed
proportion of play of each strategy in each treatment.16 As with all statistical tests in
this thesis, we used the free software R (2003) to perform FEPTs.
We conduct FEPT separately for each game. We ﬁrst compare subjects’ aggregate
actions for each player role (ﬁrst or second movers) in each of the ten games between
the Fair and Unfair treatments. Out of the 40 possible comparisons, we can never
15Developed by Fisher (1935), Irwin (1935) and Yates (1934).
16Although less common than the Chi-square test, Fisher’s test requires less data in each category
to be correctly calculated. Chi-square tests would require at least ﬁve subjects playing each action
in each treatment which, given that most subjects chose the same actions, was not satisﬁed in our
games. The main assumption required for both of these tests is independence between observations
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reject the null hypothesis of the underlying probability of each subject playing each of
the three strategies available being equal at the 5% signiﬁcance level.17 18 Notice in
table 2 that the total number of actions taken not according with Equilibrium by ﬁrst
movers is very similar between the Fair and Unfair treatments and of these, the number
of actions that coincided with the strategy leading to the equal split (“Fair Action” )
is also very similar between treatments. The same happens with the number of best
responses for second movers. We ﬁnally performed Mann-Whitney tests under the null
hypothesis that the median of the distribution of the number of games in which ﬁrst
movers chose the strategy containing the equal split was not diﬀerent between the F
and U treatments. We could never reject the null hypothesis at the 5% signiﬁcance
level.19
24.14% 7 29 68.96% 20 29 Unfair Treatment
22.58% 7 31 68.75% 22 32 Fair Treatment
Percentage Fair Actions Non- Best 
Responses
Percentage Fair Actions Non-Equilibrium 
Actions
Second Movers First Movers
24.14% 7 29 68.96% 20 29 Unfair Treatment
22.58% 7 31 68.75% 22 32 Fair Treatment
Percentage Fair Actions Non- Best 
Responses
Percentage Fair Actions Non-Equilibrium 
Actions
Second Movers First Movers
Table 2: Percentages of Non-Equilibrium Actions and Fair Actions
Thus, we conclude the following:
Result 1: Behaviour was not aﬀected by the feasibility of equal splits.
Small payoﬀ diﬀerences between the equal and unequal split might explain Result 1.
It would be worthwhile to study robustness to higher payoﬀ diﬀerences. An alternative
explanation is that the equal split was feasible (or not) in all the games subjects played.
As subjects were only paid for one of the games, our experiment shares characteristics
with experiments carried out under the strategy method, in which a weakening of the
“equal split eﬀect” has previously been observed (Güth et al. (2001)). In any case,
and admitting these caveats, our results show that there are circumstances in which
subjects do not change their behaviour whether equal splits are feasible or not when
17Although FEPT is speciﬁcally designed for small samples it is still not a very powerful test with
only ten observations in each treatment. For example using this test, we cannot reject that distribution
of answers (3,2,5) in one treatment is the same as the distribution (1,7,2) in another treatment at the
5% signiﬁcance level. However, we can reject that it is the same as (1,8,1). The power of the test
increases with the number of observations.
18Results of all FEPTs in this section are the same at the 10% signicance level.
19Same results were obtained for the null hypothesis that treatment eﬀects did not aﬀect the median
of the distribution of the number of games in which ﬁrst movers played the equilibrium strategy and
also for the distribution of second movers’ best responses to ﬁrst movers’ actions.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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deciding how to share pies of given sizes, even if one of the subjects moved previous
to the other.
Using these results, we will pool the data from “Fair” and “Unfair treatments to
report the following statistics.
5.3.3 Actions
We here look at individual behaviour. We ﬁnd that theory predictions translate well
into individual behaviour. On average, ﬁrst movers played according to Equilibrium
in 8.5 of the 10 games, while second movers best responded to ﬁrst movers’ choices in
8.65 of the games. 97.5% of ﬁrst movers played the Equilibrium action in 7 or more
games, while 95% of second movers best responded in 8 or more games. Table 3 below
shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the number of games for which
at least ﬁrst movers played according to Equilibrium predictions and the number of
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Table 3: Cummulative Distribution Function.
As we did in the previous chapter, we compared subjects’ choices across games for
both players’ roles. We performed McNemar’s tests comparing proportions of equilib-
rium play by ﬁrst movers between each pair of games under the null hypothesis that
the proportion of ﬁrst movers who played equilibrium actions was the same between
all pairs of games, both when grouping the F and U treatments and when not. We
do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences at the 5% signiﬁcance level between any
pair of games. The same occurs when we performed McNemar’s tests under the null
hypothesis that the proportion of second movers who played best responses to their
ﬁr s tm o v e r sw a sn o td i ﬀerent between all pairs of games. Our results clearly diﬀer
from what we obtained in the previous chapter where the non dominance solvable
games (NR and NC) showed much lower percentages on concordance to equilibrium
predictions than the other games. Notice that in games NR and NC, when played5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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in sequential form, best responding for the second mover is almost trivial as in most
cases, once the ﬁrst mover has chosen an equilibrium strategy, second movers would
be playing the subgame perfect equilibrium no matter what they chose. This is due
t ot h ef a c tt h a ti ng a m eN Ro n c et h eﬁrst mover plays Equilibrium, payoﬀsf o rt h e
second mover are exactly the same no matter what he chooses.20
We now compare the results of this experiment with the previous one to check if the
Equilibrium prediction works better in the sequential games than in the simultaneous
games. Given that in the sequential games we have ﬁrst and second movers, we
compare the actual percentage of times the equilibrium prediction was correct in each
of the two experiments, which is the combination of both paired subjects choosing
the Equilibrium action in each game. Table 4 reports the percentage of times the
Equilibrium prediction was right by game, where we observe that the subgame perfect
equilibrium prediction in the sequential games works better than the Nash equilibrium
prediction in the simultaneous ones, for all games.21 Chi-square tests for diﬀerences in
proportions of equilibrium play between games with the same name conﬁrm the null
hypothesis that the proportions of play were diﬀerent between the two experiments in
all games with the same name at the 5% signiﬁcance level. This result is important
because, together with the results of the following section, it provides evidence that
subjects may be better able to backward induct in our simple sequential games than
to calculate Nash equilibria in the simultaneous ones. Although this result is partially
caused by second movers observing ﬁrst movers’ choice and the high percentage of best
responses, it seems that ﬁrst movers are able to anticipate second movers’ behaviour,
even if the strategy space is more complicated in sequential games than in simultaneous
ones.
























Table 4: Percentage of Times the Equilibrium Prediction was Right.
20In game NC this only happens for one of the subject roles.
21Notice that the the data in the “Simultaneous Play” column, diﬀe r sf r o md a t ai nC h a p t e r4 ,a s
here we compute the percentage of times the unique Nash equilibrium was reached, not the equilibrium
actions.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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Therefore, we conclude:
Result 2: The Equilibrium prediction works well in constant sum games. When
the games are played sequentially, the prediction is even more accurate.
5.4 Questionnaire Answers
Given that experimental results were so close to equilibrium predictions, we wanted to
check if the reasoning process subjects claimed they used to choose their actions was
also close to the subgame perfect equilibrium reasoning process that Game Theory
would predict. Notice that, contrary to the experiment in the previous chapter, in this
experiment we did not elicit subjects’ beliefs about opponents’ choices. The reason was
that to elicit beliefs would be more complicated in sequential games as ﬁrst movers’
beliefs would be conditional on their own choice. Thus, to reward the accuracy of stated
beliefs conditional on ﬁrst movers’ choice, would require using a quadratic scoring rule
in which nine probabilities had to be stated, which could be meaningless for subjects.
Therefore, to investigate how subjects’ reasoned when choosing their actions, we use
the answers to a questionnaire distributed after the experiment in which there were
no monetary incentives for truth-telling. Therefore, we cannot make a strong point of
whether subjects really used the reasoning process they claimed when making their
decisions, but only that at least they were able to reason in those terms in our simple
games since they provided coherent explanations. Contrary to what happened in
the questionnaire of the previous experiment, here subjects’ answers were much less
vague and it was easy to classify the. The evidence presented in this section may be
useful in the ongoing debate on whether subjects are able to arrive at game theoretic
arguments without previous teaching,22 Let us remind the reader that subjects were
not Economics students, nor had they previously taken any training in Game Theory.
We classiﬁed ﬁrst movers’ answers into four categories. “Equilibrium” corresponds
to subgame perfect equilibrium reasoning. “Minimax” is self explanatory. “Fairness”
corresponds to any argument in which distributional concerns were mentioned. Finally,
“Other” corresponds to explanations that we were not able to classify. Second movers’
answers were classiﬁed between “Best Responses”, “Fairness”, when they provided
some argument for distributional concerns and “Not Answer” as two subjects did not
ﬁll in the voluntary questionnaire. Results are reported in Table 5.
22See Camerer (2003).5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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7.5% Fairness 5% Fairness
5% Not Answer 7.5% Other
22.5% Minimax
87.5% Best Response 65% Equilibrium
2nd Movers 1st Movers
7.5% Fairness 5% Fairness
5% Not Answer 7.5% Other
22.5% Minimax
87.5% Best Response 65% Equilibrium
2nd Movers 1st Movers
Table 5: Classiﬁcation of Questionnaire Answers
For ﬁrst movers, notice that even if both “Equilibrium” and “Minimax” would
lead to the same choice and ultimately they both rely in expecting the second mover
to choose their payoﬀ maximizing strategy given the ﬁrst mover’s choice and then
maximize against it, we distinguish between both kind of explanations. In total,
87.5% of ﬁrst movers’ explanations could be classiﬁed under one of these reasons.
The criterion to separate both reasons was whether the subject’s answer included a
statement referring to the “maximum of the minima”. For example, subject FCC2, a
Medicine student in his third year, oﬀered the following explanation:23
“I assumed that B participants would choose the column in which they would gain
most money, so I chose the row where I would get the most if they chose their maximum
strategy given my choice”.
We classiﬁed this and similar statements as “Equilibrium”. However subject
FRR10, a Russian History student in her second year claimed:
“Compared the three rows. Looked for the lowest number in each row. Then chose
which one of these was highest, which is the amount I would get paid”.
We classiﬁed this statement as “Minimax”. There were some cases in which the
classiﬁcation between the two was not so clear. For example subject FRR9, a second
year Geography student, claimed:
“I know that the B participant will pick the column where they stand to make the
most so I have to pick the row where the minimum I can get is higher than other rows”.
This statement seems to contain both reasons, although following the criterium
mentioned above we classiﬁed it as “Minimax”.
In any case, what it is surprising is the small number of statements that made
reference to distributional arguments. There were only two statements by ﬁrst movers
23Subjects referred to ﬁrst movers as “A participants” and to second movers as “B participants”.5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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to distributional concerns, both of them in “Unfair” treatments, and thus, in cases
where the equal split of payoﬀs was not feasible. These are the following:
“Try to choose the most equal amount”, and
“Try against ‘my better judgment’ to be fair in my choice of row, so that a fair
amount would also be allocated to B”.
With respect to second movers, 87.5% of subjects claimed they chose best responses
to the action taken by ﬁrst movers. Here we show a couple of such answers:
“For each table, there were only three options. I chose the option that would give
me most money”, and,
“Based on A’s selection, I made mine with the highest number reﬂected in the top
right corner”.
There were only three second movers who made reference to distributional con-
cerns. Of these, we here reproduce the explanation given by subject FCR9, a Linguis-
tics student in his fourth year, who seemed to hint on intentions driven reciprocity
guiding his choices:
“I tried to make a balance between the amount I could get and the money ‘A’ person
could make. I rewarded as well and paid back ‘A’ ’s decision”.
Therefore, we conclude that subjects’ claims are in line with the results of the
experiment and, in particular the percentage of subjects who claimed to have worried
for the distribution of payoﬀs was low (only 6.25% of the total of subjects).
5.5 Discussion
We have conﬁrmed that sequential constant sum games with unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which two consecutive playersh a v et h r e ep o s s i b l ec h o i c e sa r eac l a s so f
non-trivial games for which game-theoretical predictions work well, even if the games
are played for the ﬁrst time by subjects not trained in Economics and without previous
experience in laboratory games. Comparing our results with normal form games which
share the same payoﬀ matrix we ﬁnd that theory predictions work even better in the
sequential games. This is most likely caused by the fact that in the sequential games
second movers have the advantage of observing ﬁrst movers’ choices, and given that
the games are constant sum, payoﬀ maximizing for second movers is straightforward.
Even if the strategy space is more complicated, and aided by the results of the informal
questionnaire, we can conclude that subjects seem well able to backward induct in the
sequential games while in the simultaneous games we only concluded that the Nash5. Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum
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equilibrium prediction works well and that subjects behave strategically and believed
opponents would play strategically, although the reasoning process they followed is
unclear.
Contrary to our expectation, the feasibility or not of equal splits does not aﬀect
how ﬁrst movers or second movers choose. This, together with the high percentages
of subgame perfect equilibrium observed, provides some reassurance that in our ex-
periment, subjects’ behaviour was not aﬀected by other regarding preferences, with or
without intentions, as opposed to what has been observed in dictator and ultimatum
games. Diﬀerences with respect to these games seem caused by ﬁrst movers having
the option to decide and by the non possibility of punishment.
Aided by the results from our informal questionnaire we conclude that it seems
wrong to generally dismiss the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome as a good pre-
dictor of behaviour in simple sequential games, as subjects’ claims about how they
reasoned were in line with standard game theoretic arguments. The results of the two
experimental chapters of this dissertation suggest further research to help identify a
broader class of games for which we can have some conﬁdence that Game Theory is a
good predictor of players’ behaviour.  113
6   Instructions for Chapter 5 
 
 
WELCOME TO OUR EXPERIMENT! 
 
 
This is a serious scientific experiment and, as such, no talking, looking around or walking 
around will be permitted. If you have any questions or need any assistance, please raise 
your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc, YOU 
WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE AND YOU WILL NOT BE PAID. Thank you. 
 
This is an experiment on individual decision making. The ESRC Centre for Evolutionary 
Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) has provided the funds for this experiment. You 
will be paid £5 (five pounds) for having arrived on time. Additionally, if you follow the 
instructions and pass an UNDERSTANDING TEST you will be allowed to continue in 
the experiment. Once in the experiment, depending on your decisions you may earn a 
considerable additional amount of money. This additional amount will be determined 
both by your decisions and by those of other participants in the experiment. Before 
making your decisions, you will be informed about how your earnings and the other 
participants’ earnings depend on your and their decisions. All that you earn is yours to 
keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today’s session. 
 
We need 20 people for this session. Thus, if more than 20 people pass the 
UNDERSTANDING TEST, some of you will be asked not to participate in the 
experiment but to help the experimenter as “assistants”. These assistants will check that 
everything is done as explained in the instructions. The assistants will be paid the average 
of the payments of the 20 participants in the experiment. 
 
In this experiment, 10 participants will belong to group A (to whom we will refer as “A”) 
and 10 participants will belong to group B (to whom we will refer as “B”). All 
participants have to take decisions from a table they will be presented. For each table, 
each participant in group A will be anonymously matched with one participant in group 
B. 
 
Participants in group A will be presented with a TABLE. For this table, participants in 
group A will take a decision. Afterwards, participants in group B will be presented with 
the same table and, knowing what their matched participant in group A decided, they will 
make another decision. Together, the two decisions determine the number of POUNDS 
each of you earns, which may be different.  
 
 
The table in the next page shows an illustrative example. IT IS ONLY AN 
ILLUSTRATION. The tables you will see during the experiment will be different from 
this one. AS YOU LOOK AT THIS TABLE, PLEASE CONTINUE READING THIS 




















In the actual experiment, A will be shown tables like this one (but with different 
numbers), and asked to choose one decision (“UP”, “MIDDLE” or “DOWN”). After A 
takes his/her decision, the participant from B with whom they are matched for each table 
will learnt what decision A took in that table and will be asked to choose his/her decisions 
(“LEFT”, “CENTRE” or “RIGHT”). 
 
The combination of A’s decision and B’s decision determines the number of pounds they 
receive. These numbers are whole numbers ranging from 1 to 11. 
 
The number of pounds A receives appears in the lower left corner of each cell of the 
table. 
 
The number of pounds B receives appears in the upper right corner of each cell of the 
table. 
 
To interpret the table, consider the results of the possible combinations of decisions.  
  
-If A chooses UP and then B chooses LEFT, A earns 1 Pound and B earns 9 Pounds. 
-If A chooses UP and then B chooses CENTRE, A earns 2 Pounds and B earns 8 
Pounds. 
-If A chooses UP and then B chooses RIGHT, A earns 3 Pounds and B earns 7 Pounds. 
-If A chooses MIDDLE and then B chooses LEFT, A earns 4 Pounds and B earns 6 
Pounds. 
-If A chooses MIDDLE and then B chooses CENTRE, A earns 5 Pounds and B earns 5 
Pounds. 
-If A chooses MIDDLE and then B chooses RIGHT, A earns 6 Pounds and B earns 4 
Pounds. 
-If A chooses DOWN and then B chooses LEFT, A earns 7 Pounds and B earns 3 
Pounds. 
-If A chooses DOWN and then B chooses CENTRE, A earns 8 Pounds and B earns 2 
Pounds. 
-If A chooses DOWN and then B chooses RIGHT, A earns 9 Pounds and B earns 1 
Pound. 
Please be sure you understand this table. Raise your hand if you would like further 
explanation. Otherwise, please start with the Understanding Test in the next page. Please 




























You will now take a short UNDERSTANDING TEST. After you have finished the 
TEST, it will be graded and you will ONLY be allowed to continue in the experiment if 
you have answered ALL the QUESTIONS CORRECTLY. If one or more of your 
answers is not correct, we will ask you to be our assistant and to check that everything 
proceeds as explained in the instructions. Notice that even if all your answers are correct, 
you may be asked to be our assistant. 
This test has 5 questions. After you have answered all 5 questions, please re-check your 





















1. If A chooses MIDDLE and afterwards B choosess RIGHT, how many Pounds will A 
earn? __ 
 
2. If A chooses UP and afterwards B choosess LEFT, how many Pounds will B earn?  
_______ 
 
3. If A chooses UP and afterwards B choosess RIGHT, how many Pounds will A earn?  
_______ 
 
4. If A chooses DOWN and afterwards B choosess CENTRE, how many Pounds will A 
earn? __ 
 





YOU HAVE JUST COMPLETED THE TEST.  





























There are 20 participants in this experiment. We have randomly divided the 20 
participants in two groups of 10 participants (“group A” and “group B”). Everyone 
has been recruited for this experiment using the same procedure and everyone has 
been assigned to one of the two groups randomly. 
 
We are going to show you 10 different tables, similar to the one you have already 
seen. 
 
For each of the 10 tables you receive a different answer sheet. In each answer sheet 
you will have to make a decision. Below we explain how to make your choices and 
how you will be paid for them. 
 
First, participants of group A will circle their decision (UP, MIDDLE or DOWN) 
in each of the 10 tables. 
 
After A have made all their choices, their answers sheets will be collected. 
  
Then, participants in group B will receive 10 answer sheets, each one 
corresponding to a different table and coming from a different participant from 
group A. 
 
Therefore, participants in group B will know what the participant from group A 
with whom they are matched in each table has chosen for each table. 
  
After receiving the answer sheets, participants in group B will choose between 
“LEFT”, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT” in each of the 10 tables. These choices, 
together with the choice by the participant in group A, will select a cell in each of 
the 10 tables. 
 
Notice that for each of the 10 tables, you will be anonymously and randomly 
matched with one of the 10 participants from the other group. 
 
YOU HAVE BEEN MATCHED WITH A DIFFERENT PARTICIPANT IN 
EACH TABLE. 
 
NO PARTICIPANT IN THIS EXPERIMENT WILL KNOW WHO THEY ARE 
MATCHED WITH FOR ANY PARTICULAR TABLE. 
 
NO PARTICIPANT IN THIS EXPERIMENT WILL KNOW THE CHOICE 













In the table below A circles “DOWN” to indicate that DOWN is his choice. After 














Caution: The numbers used in this example were selected arbitrarily. They 
are NOT intended to suggest how anyone might choose in any situation. 
 




After the experiment is finished, we will randomly select ONE table from which all 
payments to all participants will be done. This table will be selected using a bingo 
urn with 10 numbered balls. The number on the ball selected determines for which 
of the 10 tables all participants are paid.  
 
Participants from group A will be paid a number of pounds equal to the number 
that appears in the left down corner of the cell chosen by them and their matched 
participant from group B in the selected table. 
 
Participants from group B will be paid the amount of pounds that appears in the 
upper right corner of the cell chosen by them and their matched participant from 
group A in the selected table. 
 
YOU BELONG TO GROUP A (B) 
 
You (Your matched participant in the table selected) will be paid the sum of two 
things: 
 
- £5 for arriving on time. 
- The amount of pounds indicated in the lower left corner in the chosen cell of the 
selected table. 
 
Your matched participant in the table selected (You) from group B  will be paid: 
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- The amount of pounds that appears in the upper right corner in the chosen cell of 





We will wait until all participants in group A have finished choosing in the 10 
tables, to give the answer sheets to participants in group B. Please take some time 
to think and check your answers. We will allow each participant a maximum of 20 
minutes to answer all questions. Please, if you finish before time raise your hand 
and we will collect your answers.  




You have been given an identification number. Please write this number at the 
top of each of your answer sheets (where it says “GROUP A (B) 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER”) and keep the number. You will need this 
number to be paid. 
 
While we calculate the payments you will be asked to fill in an anonymous 
questionnaire. After we have done the calculations, you will be asked to come with 
the questionnaire and your identification number to a room where you will be paid 
your earnings in cash and in private.  
  
 
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO 
START 
(Please raise your hand if there are any doubts with these instructions, and we will 





























7  The Games in Chapter 5 
 
Below we show each of the ten games subjects played in “Unfair” treatments. Below each game 
we indicate the cell that was changed to create the “Fair” treatments. Additionally, we indicate the 



























































Left  Centre  Right 
Game 1R 
Equilibrium 
First: 0   Second: 0 
 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Middle-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 5   Second: 0 
First: 95   Second: 100 























Left  Centre  Right 
Equilibrium 
First: 0   Second: 0 
First: 10   Second: 0 
First: 90   Second: 100 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 




































































Left  Centre  Right 
Game 2R 
Equilibrium 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Up-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 100   Second: 95 
First: 0   Second: 5 
First: 0   Second: 0 






















Left  Centre  Right 
Game 2C 
Equilibrium 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 5   Second: 0 
First: 0   Second: 0 
First: 95   Bel: 100 




































































Left  Centre  Right  Game 3R 
Equilibrium 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Up-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 100   Second: 100 
First: 0   Second: 0 
First: 0   Second: 0 






















Left  Centre  Right 
Game 3C 
Equilibrium 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Right Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 0   Second: 0 
First: 85   Second: 100 
First: 15   Second: 0 




































































Left  Centre  Right 
Equilibrium 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Middle-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
 
Game 4R
First: 0   Second: 0 
First: 10   Second: 0 
First: 90   Second: 100 






















Left  Centre  Right 
Game 4C 
Equilibrium 
In the “Fair” treatment, the Middle-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 90   Second: 100 
First: 5   Second: 0 
First: 5   Second: 0 










































































In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Right Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
First: 0   Second:  10 
First: 100   Second: 35 
First: 0   Second: 55 


























First: 0   Second: 5 
First: 100   Second: 90
First: 0   Second: 5 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Up-Centre Payoff was changed by (6,6). 
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